Theft, Gift-Giving, and Reciprocity: A South African Experiment

被引:0
|
作者
Pecenka, Clinton J. [1 ]
Kundhlande, Godfrey [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN USA
[2] Univ Orange Free State, Bloemfontein, Free State, South Africa
来源
JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES | 2014年 / 50卷 / 11期
关键词
MOTIVATION; EXCHANGE; MARKETS; FIELD;
D O I
10.1080/00220388.2014.925540
中图分类号
F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
This paper uses a taking game to examine how South African subjects alter the amount they choose to 'steal' in response to a resource transfer from the potential victim. Any positive resource transfer significantly reduces the amount taken. 'Small' transfers reduce a victim's total losses, including the transfer and the subsequent 'theft'. Larger transfers increase a victim's total losses. This study failed to find that differences in the frame of a transfer (i.e. gift, as a bribe, or as a payment) influenced a taker's response to the transfer.
引用
收藏
页码:1467 / 1481
页数:15
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