Investing in suppliers with capacity constraints in a decentralized assembly system

被引:14
|
作者
Fu, Hong [1 ,2 ]
Li, Kai [1 ,2 ]
Fu, Weizhong [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Hefei Univ Technol, Sch Management, Hefei 230009, Anhui, Peoples R China
[2] Minist Educ, Key Lab Proc Optimizat & Intelligent Decis Making, Hefei 230009, Anhui, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Assembly system; Capacity investment; Supplier development; Uncertain demand; Stackelberg game; PRODUCTION DECISIONS; RANDOM YIELD; CHAIN; COORDINATION; COMPETITION; INVESTMENT; QUALITY; PULL; PUSH; CONTRACTS;
D O I
10.1016/j.cie.2020.106332
中图分类号
TP39 [计算机的应用];
学科分类号
081203 ; 0835 ;
摘要
This study investigates a decentralized assembly system, in which a single downstream assembler buys complementary components from multiple upstream suppliers, and then assembles them into a final product to satisfy an uncertain market demand. Suppliers have capacity constraints, and the assembler considers to invest in suppliers to increase their capacities. The investment problem of the assembler is a complex multi-dimensional optimization problem. We first characterize the optimal pricing and production decisions of all supply chain members assuming that the investment strategy is given. We then derive optimal investment strategy for the assembler. We show that the assembler's optimal total investment increases in the retail price, and decreases in both the component production cost and the assembly cost, but is nonmonotonically related to the component capacity expansion cost. We also show that the performance of the entire supply chain highly depends on the allocation of the total component cost between the capacity expansion and production activities.
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页数:16
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