Dual-class stock structure helps insiders gain control through different voting rights, but also exacerbates the principal-agent conflict. The separation of control rights and cash flow rights enhances managerial opportunistic behavior. We find that dual-class stock structure aggravates the over-investment behavior of listed firms. The impact of free cash flow on over-investment is more severe in dual class firms than in single-class firms. Paying cash dividends reduces the effects of dual-class stock structure, and separation of control and cash flow rights on overinvestment. Regulators need to strengthen the supervision to restrict managerial opportunistic behavior in firms with dual-class share structure.
机构:
Harvard Law Sch, Law Econ & Finance, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Harvard Law Sch, Program Corp Governance, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAHarvard Law Sch, Law Econ & Finance, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Bebchuk, Lucian A.
Kastiel, Kobi
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Harvard Law Sch, Program Corp Governance, Project Controlling Shareholders, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAHarvard Law Sch, Law Econ & Finance, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
机构:
Kent State Univ, Ambassador Crawford Coll Business & Entrepreneurs, Dept Finance, Kent, OH 44240 USAKent State Univ, Ambassador Crawford Coll Business & Entrepreneurs, Dept Finance, Kent, OH 44240 USA
Baran, Lindsay
Forst, Arno
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Univ Texas Rio Grande Valley, Robert C Vackar Coll Business & Entrepreneurship, Sch Accountancy, Brownsville, TX USAKent State Univ, Ambassador Crawford Coll Business & Entrepreneurs, Dept Finance, Kent, OH 44240 USA
Forst, Arno
Via, M. Tony
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Kent State Univ, Ambassador Crawford Coll Business & Entrepreneurs, Dept Finance, Kent, OH 44240 USAKent State Univ, Ambassador Crawford Coll Business & Entrepreneurs, Dept Finance, Kent, OH 44240 USA
机构:
Pi Touch Inst, Dept Econ, Seoul, South Korea
Pi Touch Inst, 8F AIA Tower Bldg 16, Tongil ro 2-gil, Seoul, South KoreaPi Touch Inst, Dept Econ, Seoul, South Korea
机构:
Chair of Business Management, Westfälische-Wilhelms University of Münster, Georgskommende 26, MünsterChair of Business Management, Westfälische-Wilhelms University of Münster, Georgskommende 26, Münster
机构:
Department of Finance, Mays Business School, Texas A and M University, College StationDepartment of Finance, Mays Business School, Texas A and M University, College Station
Boehmer E.
Sanger G.C.
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机构:
Department of Finance, Louisiana State University, Baton RougeDepartment of Finance, Mays Business School, Texas A and M University, College Station
Sanger G.C.
Varshney S.B.
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Department of Finance, SUNY Institute of Technology, School of Management, Utica, NY 13504-3050Department of Finance, Mays Business School, Texas A and M University, College Station