TOO BIG TO FAIL;
Moral hazard;
The Morocan banking system;
liquidity risk;
BANKING;
D O I:
暂无
中图分类号:
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号:
12 ;
1201 ;
1202 ;
120202 ;
摘要:
A financial institution that could be known as a systematic bank that can easily engage in risky strategies as it's certain that it will be bailed out by its central bank. The central bank fears liquidity risk contagion to the other banks. The situation raise worries about the emergence of moral hazard by so increasing the liquidity risk in a general manner. The purpose of this article is to determine the existence of such banks in morocco that can eventually force the central bank the back them up. Our reflexion was translated by the study of the banking sector balance sheets over the last decade in order to identify through various indicators the Moroccan TOO BIG TO FAIL.
机构:
Fudan Univ, Fanhai Int Sch Finance FISF, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R ChinaFudan Univ, Fanhai Int Sch Finance FISF, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
Ma, Chang
Nguyen, Xuan-Hai
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Minist Labour Invalids & Social Affairs MOLISA, Dept Employment, Hanoi, VietnamFudan Univ, Fanhai Int Sch Finance FISF, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
机构:
MIT, Alfred P Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
Int Monetary Fund, Washington, DC 20431 USAMIT, Alfred P Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA