Layoffs, top executive pay, and firm performance

被引：0
|
作者：
Hallock, KF
机构：
[1] Univ Illinois, Dept Econ, Champaign, IL 61820 USA
[2] Univ Illinois, Inst Labor & Ind Relat, Champaign, IL 61820 USA
来源：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1998年 / 88卷 / 04期
关键词：
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper examines the connection between layoffs, executive pay, and stock prices. Firms that announce layoffs in the previous year pay their CEOs more, and give their CEOs larger percentage raises than firms which do not have at least one layoff announcement in the previous year. However, the likelihood of announcing a layoff varies dramatically along other dimensions, for example firm size, which are also correlated with CEO pay. Once firm-specific fixed effects are controlled for, the CEO pay premium for laying off workers disappears. In addition, there is a small negative share price reaction to layoff announcements.
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页码：711 / 723
页数：13
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