Pay dispersion among the top management team and outside directors: Its impact on firm risk and firm performance

被引:17
|
作者
Patel, Pankaj C. [1 ]
Li, Mingxiang [2 ]
Triana, Maria del Carmen [3 ]
Park, Haemin Dennis [4 ]
机构
[1] Villanova Univ, Villanova Sch Business, 800 Lancaster Ave, Villanova, PA 19401 USA
[2] Florida Atlantic Univ, Management, Boca Raton, FL 33431 USA
[3] Univ Wisconsin Madison, Management & Human Resources Dept, Madison, WI USA
[4] Univ Texas Dallas, Naveen Jindal Sch Management, Richardson, TX 75083 USA
关键词
dual-agency framework; pay dispersion; performance; relative deprivation; strategic risk; tournament theory; CEO STOCK-OPTIONS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; BOARD COMPOSITION; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; STRATEGIC RISK; PERCEIVED OVERQUALIFICATION; FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; WAGE DISPERSION; MODERATING ROLE;
D O I
10.1002/hrm.21872
中图分类号
B849 [应用心理学];
学科分类号
040203 ;
摘要
Two key groups central to improving firm performance are the top management team (TMT) and the board of directors. Executives undertake strategic actions, whereas board members fulfill their resource provision and monitoring roles. Drawing on tournament theory and equity theory, we propose that high pay dispersion among outside directors and the TMT is positively associated with strategic risk, whereas high (low) TMT pay dispersion and low (high) outside director pay dispersion are positively associated with firm performance. Our predictor is the unexplained component of horizontal pay dispersion, or the residual of pay dispersion resulting from regressing pay on observable firm, industry, period, and individual characteristics. Our results highlight the importance of unexplained pay dispersion for TMTs, but not for boards of directors, in improving firm performance.
引用
收藏
页码:177 / 192
页数:16
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