WHEN ARE VOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRAINTS VOLUNTARY? A DIFFERENTIAL GAME APPROACH

被引:3
|
作者
Fujiwara, Kenji [1 ]
机构
[1] Kwansei Gakuin Univ, Sch Econ, Nishinomiya, Hyogo 6628501, Japan
关键词
DYNAMIC DUOPOLISTIC COMPETITION; INTERNATIONAL POLLUTION-CONTROL; STICKY PRICES; NONCOOPERATIVE STRATEGIES; NONLINEAR STRATEGIES; CLOSED-LOOP; OLIGOPOLY; FEEDBACK; TRADE; MODEL;
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-8454.2010.00390.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We revisit voluntariness of voluntary export restraints (VERs) in a differential game model of duopoly with sticky prices. We show that a VER set at the free trade level has no effect on equilibrium under open-loop strategies while the same policy results in a smaller profit for the exporting firm, i.e. it is involuntary under a non-linear feedback strategy. Moreover, we prove an extended proposition of Dockner and Haug (1991) on voluntariness of VERs under a linear feedback strategy.
引用
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页码:101 / 110
页数:10
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