WHEN ARE VOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRAINTS VOLUNTARY? A DIFFERENTIAL GAME APPROACH

被引：3
|
作者：
Fujiwara, Kenji [1 ]
机构：
[1] Kwansei Gakuin Univ, Sch Econ, Nishinomiya, Hyogo 6628501, Japan
来源：
AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS | 2010年 / 49卷 / 02期
关键词：
DYNAMIC DUOPOLISTIC COMPETITION; INTERNATIONAL POLLUTION-CONTROL; STICKY PRICES; NONCOOPERATIVE STRATEGIES; NONLINEAR STRATEGIES; CLOSED-LOOP; OLIGOPOLY; FEEDBACK; TRADE; MODEL;
D O I：
10.1111/j.1467-8454.2010.00390.x
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We revisit voluntariness of voluntary export restraints (VERs) in a differential game model of duopoly with sticky prices. We show that a VER set at the free trade level has no effect on equilibrium under open-loop strategies while the same policy results in a smaller profit for the exporting firm, i.e. it is involuntary under a non-linear feedback strategy. Moreover, we prove an extended proposition of Dockner and Haug (1991) on voluntariness of VERs under a linear feedback strategy.
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页码：101 / 110
页数：10
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