National Hockey League;
Tournaments;
Dual incentives;
Strategic losing;
Sport data;
Natural field experiment;
LEAGUE;
DRAFT;
BASKETBALL;
SABOTAGE;
WIN;
D O I:
10.1016/j.joep.2018.07.004
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
This paper analyzes data from a tournament, namely the National Hockey League regular scheduled season of games, which provides incentives to increase effort in order to reach the playoffs and incentives to decrease effort once a team has been eliminated from playoff considerations because of the entry draft. Our results show that teams react to these dual incentives they win more games when there is still a chance to reach the playoffs and lose more after being eliminated from playoff considerations. One can argue that losing more games after having no more chance to reach the playoffs could be the result of lower motivation or disappointment. This is the first study to show that this is not the only explanation for a higher amount of lost games. Instead, we find that there is a concrete strategy behind losing.
机构:
The Citadel, Tommy & Victoria Baker Sch Business, Mil Coll South Carolina, Charleston, SC 29409 USAThe Citadel, Tommy & Victoria Baker Sch Business, Mil Coll South Carolina, Charleston, SC 29409 USA
机构:
Univ Texas Rio Grande Valley, Robert C Vackar Coll Business & Entrepreneurship, Dept Econ & Finance, 1201 W Univ Dr, Edinburg, TX 78539 USAUniv Connecticut, Sch Business, 2100 Hillside Rd, Storrs, CT 06269 USA
机构:
Guangdong Univ Finance, Sch Credit Management, Guangzhou, Peoples R ChinaGuangdong Univ Finance, Sch Credit Management, Guangzhou, Peoples R China
Mei, Chun
Deng, Mingmao
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h-index: 0
机构:
Shanghai Univ, Int Business & Econ, Sch Finance, Shanghai, Peoples R ChinaGuangdong Univ Finance, Sch Credit Management, Guangzhou, Peoples R China