Organizational capital;
Tournament incentives;
CEO compensation;
Agency costs;
D O I:
暂无
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
This paper examines the relationship between organization capital and promotion-based tournament incentives. Using a sample of 33,618 publicly listed U.S. firm-year observations covering 1992-2020, the results show that firms with high levels of organization capital have relatively more promotion-based tournament incentives, and that tournament incentives in high organization capital firms improve firm value and operating performance.
机构:
EM Normandie Business Sch, Metis Lab, Le Havre, France
Vietnam Natl Univ, Int Sch, Hanoi, VietnamEM Normandie Business Sch, Metis Lab, Le Havre, France
Boubaker, Sabri
Hasan, Mostafa Monzur
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Macquarie Univ, Macquarie Business Sch, Sydney, NSW, AustraliaEM Normandie Business Sch, Metis Lab, Le Havre, France
Hasan, Mostafa Monzur
Habib, Ahsan
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Massey Univ, Sch Accountancy, Private Bag 102904, Auckland, New ZealandEM Normandie Business Sch, Metis Lab, Le Havre, France
机构:
China Cinda Asset Management Co Ltd, Postdoctoral Workstat, Beijing, Peoples R ChinaChina Cinda Asset Management Co Ltd, Postdoctoral Workstat, Beijing, Peoples R China
Qin, Huai
Huang, Yongjian
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Cent Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Finance, Beijing, Peoples R ChinaChina Cinda Asset Management Co Ltd, Postdoctoral Workstat, Beijing, Peoples R China