This paper analyses the impact of both horizontal and vertical tax competition on central government transfers towards regions, as well as on the softness of the regional budget constraint. We show that tax interactions have no impact on the optimal central government grant whereas they harden the regional budget constraint when the regional debt is not too heavy. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机构:
Stockholm Sch Econ, Dept Finance, S-11383 Stockholm, SwedenStockholm Sch Econ, Dept Finance, S-11383 Stockholm, Sweden
Huse, Cristian
Oliveira, Alessandro V. M.
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机构:
Latin Amer Ctr Transportat Econ, Aeronaut Inst Technol, BR-12228900 Sao Jose Dos Campos, SP, BrazilStockholm Sch Econ, Dept Finance, S-11383 Stockholm, Sweden