Does tax competition soften regional budget constraint?

被引：13
|
作者：
Breuillé, ML
Madiès, T
Taugourdeau, E
机构：
[1] Univ Paris 10, THEMA, F-92001 Nanterre, France
[2] Univ Fribourg, CNRS, CREM, CH-1700 Fribourg, Switzerland
[3] Univ Caen, CNRS, CREM, F-14032 Caen, France
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2006年 / 90卷 / 02期
关键词：
tax competition; soft budget constraint; fiscal federalism;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2005.08.010
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper analyses the impact of both horizontal and vertical tax competition on central government transfers towards regions, as well as on the softness of the regional budget constraint. We show that tax interactions have no impact on the optimal central government grant whereas they harden the regional budget constraint when the regional debt is not too heavy. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：230 / 236
页数：7
相关论文
共 50 条
12345