Are Bonus Pools Driven by Their Incentive Effects? Evidence from Fluctuations in Gainsharing Incentives

被引:4
|
作者
Benson, Alan M. [1 ]
Sajjadiani, Sima [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Minnesota, Carlson Sch Management, Minneapolis, MN 55455 USA
关键词
incentives; bonus pools; gainsharing; RESOURCE MANAGEMENT-PRACTICES; INTRINSIC MOTIVATION; PERFORMANCE; PRODUCTIVITY; PAY; IMPACT; OWNERSHIP; PAYMENT; SYSTEMS; CHOICE;
D O I
10.1177/0019793917726066
中图分类号
F24 [劳动经济];
学科分类号
020106 ; 020207 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Bonus pools, in which a worker's realized bonus depends both on a worker's share of the pool (which serves as the incentive) and on the size of the pool (which is largely outside of the worker's control), are a common method for distributing incentive pay. Using data on the variation in the size of the bonus pool generated by a US manufacturing plant's gainsharing plan, which varies incentives for quality and worker engagement, the authors evaluate the conditions under which such bonuses have incentive effects. Overall, results are cautionary: The evidence suggests gainsharing's benefits operate outside of the incentive channel, and incentives may backfire if they are too small or too diluted by group performance metrics. The authors illustrate how random variation in the size of bonus pools offers researchers a powerful, readily available, and underused tool for studying how workers respond to the availability and strength of incentives.
引用
收藏
页码:567 / 599
页数:33
相关论文
共 50 条