Investment and liquidation in renegotiation-proof contracts with moral hazard

被引：56
|
作者：
Quadrini, V [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ So Calif, Dept Finance & Business Econ, Marshall Sch Business, Los Angeles, CA 90089 USA
[2] NYU, Stern Sch Business, Dept Econ, New York, NY 10012 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS | 2004年 / 51卷 / 04期
基金：
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词：
financial contract; Finn investment; liquidation; renegotiation-proof;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2003.08.014
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
In a long-term contract with moral hazard, the liquidation of the firm can arise Lis the outcome of the optimal contract. However, if the future production capability or market opportunities remain unchanged, liquidation may not be Free from renegotiation. Will the firm ever be liquidated if we allow for renegotiation? This paper shows that the firm can still be liquidated even though liquidation is not free from renegotiation in the long-term contract. In addition to liquidation, the renegotiation-proof contract generates important features of the investment behavior and dynamics of firms observed in the data. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：713 / 751
页数：39
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