Tripartite evolutionary game and simulation analysis of governments, enterprises, and consumers under a carbon-generalised system of preferences

被引:2
|
作者
Qian, Yunchen [1 ]
Yue, Ting [2 ]
机构
[1] Saitama Univ, Grad Sch Humanities & Social Sci, Saitama 3388570, Japan
[2] China Univ Min & Technol, Sch Management, Xuzhou 221000, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
green market; carbon emissions trading; purchasing behaviour; evolutionary game; !text type='Python']Python[!/text; policy efficiency; SUPPLY CHAIN; STRATEGIES; INTERVENTION; DECISIONS; BEHAVIOR;
D O I
10.1504/IJGW.2024.135985
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
China's pilot carbon-generalised system of preferences reflects its commitment to net-zero transition. To understand market development under this system, we built an evolutionary game model involving governments, enterprises, and consumers. Using MATLAB and SciPy, we conducted experimental analyses and numerical simulations that considered uncertainty in consumers' purchasing behaviour. The results highlight six key factors influencing the game among three players. By considering these factors, we constructed a green market governance mechanism based on constraint, market, and reverse-forcing mechanisms. Emphasising fair benefit distribution across time periods promotes cooperation and environmental justice, leading to green market development.
引用
收藏
页码:226 / 244
页数:20
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