Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Power Battery Cascade Utilization Under Government Subsidies

被引:4
|
作者
Guan, Yue [1 ]
He, Tian-Hui [2 ]
Hou, Qiang [1 ]
机构
[1] Shenyang Univ Technol, Sch Management, Shenyang, Peoples R China
[2] China Med Univ, Sch Int Educ, Taichung 110122, Taiwan
关键词
Cascade utilization; closed-loop supply chain; three-party evolution game; power battery; SUPPLY CHAIN;
D O I
10.1109/ACCESS.2023.3290171
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
The continued industrialization of new-energy vehicles has facilitated the rapid growth of the massive retired power battery drive recovery and cascade utilization industries. Improving the full lifecycle value of power batteries and recycling necessary materials has recently emerged as a hot issue. Cascade utilization, disassembly and recycling of power batteries are some key strategies to address this concern. In the context of government subsidies and extended producer responsibility, a tripartite evolutionary game model of manufacturers, third-party recyclers and cascade utilization enterprises is constructed in this study to enhance the entire lifecycle value of power batteries for the double closed-loop supply chain containing cascade utilization. Moreover, the stability of each subject's strategy selection is analyzed, the effects of related factors on each subject's strategy selection are examined, and the conditions for the stable evolution of the tripartite game to the equilibrium point are further discussed. The research demonstrates that: 1) increasing government subsidies and manufacturers' reasonable formulation of internal incentive mechanisms in the supply chain are conducive to the coordinated development of the supply chain. In addition, relevant subjects jointly promote the healthy development of the cascade utilization industry; 2) the expected profits of various subjects are essential factors that affect their decision-making. Improving the profits of adopting recycled materials remanufacturing, high-level processing and large-scale cascade utilization are conducive to enhancing the comprehensive utilization level of industrial resources; 3) reducing the potential risks of the innovative development of recyclers and cascade utilization enterprises can increase the enthusiasm of both parties to promote the practical improvement of cascade utilization levels; and 4) raising the environmental treatment fees of professional battery disassembly enterprises is an effective approach to promote the resource utilization efficiency. Finally, Octave was applied for numerical simulation. Relevant countermeasures and suggestions were proposed for the coordinated and efficient development of power battery cascade utilization based on the influence relationship of various factors and equilibrium point stability conditions.
引用
收藏
页码:66382 / 66399
页数:18
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Tripartite evolutionary game analysis of power battery carbon footprint disclosure under the EU battery regulation
    Xia, Xiaoning
    Li, Pengwei
    Cheng, Yang
    ENERGY, 2023, 284
  • [2] Waste battery-to-reutilization decisions under government subsidies: An evolutionary game approach
    Zhang, Huiming
    Zhu, Kexin
    Hang, Zixuan
    Zhou, Dequn
    Zhou, Yi
    Xu, Zhidong
    ENERGY, 2022, 259
  • [3] A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Enterprise Data Sharing Under Government Regulations
    Dong, Ying
    Sun, Zhongyuan
    Qiu, Luyi
    Systems, 2025, 13 (03):
  • [4] Evolutionary game analysis of WEEE recycling tripartite stakeholders under variable subsidies and processing fees
    Li, Shuhao
    Sun, Qiang
    ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND POLLUTION RESEARCH, 2023, 30 (05) : 11584 - 11599
  • [5] Evolutionary game analysis of WEEE recycling tripartite stakeholders under variable subsidies and processing fees
    Shuhao Li
    Qiang Sun
    Environmental Science and Pollution Research, 2023, 30 (5) : 11584 - 11599
  • [6] Strategies for shore power facility utilisation under government subsidies: a three-party evolutionary game and simulation analysis
    Yin, Wenwei
    Zhao, Tingfeng
    Yue, Zhongyun
    MARITIME POLICY & MANAGEMENT, 2025,
  • [7] Tripartite evolutionary game and simulation analysis of fishermen participating in cooperative management under government supervision
    Su, Meng
    Cheng, Kai
    Kong, Hao
    Xue, Yukun
    Liang, Danting
    OCEAN & COASTAL MANAGEMENT, 2023, 236
  • [8] Entry barriers and tripartite evolutionary game analysis of seawater desalination under the government regulation in China
    Chen, Mingbao
    Xu, Zhibin
    Wang, Yuhao
    FRONTIERS IN MARINE SCIENCE, 2023, 10
  • [9] Tripartite evolutionary game analysis of carbon emission reduction behavior strategies under government regulation
    Wei, Jie
    Li, Yining
    Liu, Yushun
    ENVIRONMENT DEVELOPMENT AND SUSTAINABILITY, 2024,
  • [10] Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Shared Manufacturing by Manufacturing Companies under Government Regulation Mechanism
    Liu, Peng
    Wei, Xiaoling
    Liu, Caiyun
    DISCRETE DYNAMICS IN NATURE AND SOCIETY, 2022, 2022