Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Power Battery Cascade Utilization Under Government Subsidies

被引:4
|
作者
Guan, Yue [1 ]
He, Tian-Hui [2 ]
Hou, Qiang [1 ]
机构
[1] Shenyang Univ Technol, Sch Management, Shenyang, Peoples R China
[2] China Med Univ, Sch Int Educ, Taichung 110122, Taiwan
关键词
Cascade utilization; closed-loop supply chain; three-party evolution game; power battery; SUPPLY CHAIN;
D O I
10.1109/ACCESS.2023.3290171
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
The continued industrialization of new-energy vehicles has facilitated the rapid growth of the massive retired power battery drive recovery and cascade utilization industries. Improving the full lifecycle value of power batteries and recycling necessary materials has recently emerged as a hot issue. Cascade utilization, disassembly and recycling of power batteries are some key strategies to address this concern. In the context of government subsidies and extended producer responsibility, a tripartite evolutionary game model of manufacturers, third-party recyclers and cascade utilization enterprises is constructed in this study to enhance the entire lifecycle value of power batteries for the double closed-loop supply chain containing cascade utilization. Moreover, the stability of each subject's strategy selection is analyzed, the effects of related factors on each subject's strategy selection are examined, and the conditions for the stable evolution of the tripartite game to the equilibrium point are further discussed. The research demonstrates that: 1) increasing government subsidies and manufacturers' reasonable formulation of internal incentive mechanisms in the supply chain are conducive to the coordinated development of the supply chain. In addition, relevant subjects jointly promote the healthy development of the cascade utilization industry; 2) the expected profits of various subjects are essential factors that affect their decision-making. Improving the profits of adopting recycled materials remanufacturing, high-level processing and large-scale cascade utilization are conducive to enhancing the comprehensive utilization level of industrial resources; 3) reducing the potential risks of the innovative development of recyclers and cascade utilization enterprises can increase the enthusiasm of both parties to promote the practical improvement of cascade utilization levels; and 4) raising the environmental treatment fees of professional battery disassembly enterprises is an effective approach to promote the resource utilization efficiency. Finally, Octave was applied for numerical simulation. Relevant countermeasures and suggestions were proposed for the coordinated and efficient development of power battery cascade utilization based on the influence relationship of various factors and equilibrium point stability conditions.
引用
收藏
页码:66382 / 66399
页数:18
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