MORAL HAZARD;
CROP INSURANCE;
RISK;
CONSUMPTION;
CHURCH;
SACRIFICE;
MARRIAGE;
TRUST;
D O I:
10.1017/S0022109022000722
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
Informal risk sharing within social networks and formal financial contracts both enable households to manage risk. We find that financial contracting reduces participation in social networks. Specifically, increased crop insurance usage decreased local religious adherence and congregation membership in agricultural communities. Our identification utilizes the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994 that doubled crop insurance usage nationally within a year, although changes in usage varied across counties. Difference-in-difference and Spatial First Difference tests confirm that households substituted insurance for religiosity. This substitution was associated with reductions in crop diversification and crop yields, indicating an increase in moral hazard.
机构:
Maastricht Univ, Fac Hlth Med & Life Sci, Dept Human Biol, NL-6200 MD Maastricht, NetherlandsMaastricht Univ, Fac Hlth Med & Life Sci, Dept Human Biol, NL-6200 MD Maastricht, Netherlands
Brouns, Fred J. P. H.
van Buul, Vincent J.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Maastricht Univ, Fac Hlth Med & Life Sci, Dept Human Biol, NL-6200 MD Maastricht, NetherlandsMaastricht Univ, Fac Hlth Med & Life Sci, Dept Human Biol, NL-6200 MD Maastricht, Netherlands
van Buul, Vincent J.
Shewry, Peter R.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Rothamsted Res, Plant Biol & Crop Sci, Harpenden AL5 2JQ, Herts, EnglandMaastricht Univ, Fac Hlth Med & Life Sci, Dept Human Biol, NL-6200 MD Maastricht, Netherlands