Does Finance Make Us Less Social?

被引:1
|
作者
Cronqvist, Henrik [1 ]
Warachka, Mitch [1 ]
Yu, Frank [2 ]
机构
[1] Chapman Univ, Argyros Sch Business & Econ, Orange, CA 92866 USA
[2] China Europe Int Business Sch, Shanghai, Peoples R China
关键词
MORAL HAZARD; CROP INSURANCE; RISK; CONSUMPTION; CHURCH; SACRIFICE; MARRIAGE; TRUST;
D O I
10.1017/S0022109022000722
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Informal risk sharing within social networks and formal financial contracts both enable households to manage risk. We find that financial contracting reduces participation in social networks. Specifically, increased crop insurance usage decreased local religious adherence and congregation membership in agricultural communities. Our identification utilizes the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994 that doubled crop insurance usage nationally within a year, although changes in usage varied across counties. Difference-in-difference and Spatial First Difference tests confirm that households substituted insurance for religiosity. This substitution was associated with reductions in crop diversification and crop yields, indicating an increase in moral hazard.
引用
收藏
页码:1230 / 1262
页数:33
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