How committed individuals shape social dynamics: A survey on coordination games and social dilemma games

被引:13
|
作者
Shen, Chen [1 ]
Guo, Hao [2 ,3 ]
Hu, Shuyue [4 ]
Shi, Lei [5 ]
Wang, Zhen [3 ]
Tanmoto, Jun [1 ,6 ]
机构
[1] Kyushu Univ, Fac Engn Sci, Fukuoka 8168580, Japan
[2] Northwestern Polytech Univ, Sch Mech Engn, Xian 710072, Peoples R China
[3] Northwestern Polytech Univ, Sch Artificial Intelligence Opt & Elect iOPEN, Xian 710072, Peoples R China
[4] Shanghai Artificial Intelligence Lab, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[5] Yunnan Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Stat & Math, Kunming 650221, Peoples R China
[6] Kyushu Univ Fukuoka, Interdisciplinary Grad Sch Engn Sci, Fukuoka 8168580, Japan
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
COOPERATION; EMERGENCE;
D O I
10.1209/0295-5075/acfb34
中图分类号
O4 [物理学];
学科分类号
0702 ;
摘要
- Committed individuals, who feature steadfast dedication to advocating strong beliefs, values, and preferences, have garnered much attention across statistical physics, social science, and computer science. This survey delves into the profound impact of committed individuals on social dynamics that emerge from coordination games and social dilemma games. Through separate examinations of their influence on coordination, including social conventions and color coordination games, and social dilemma games, including one-shot settings, repeated settings, and vaccination games, this survey reveals the significant role committed individuals play in shaping social dynamics. Their contributions range from accelerating or overturning social conventions to addressing cooperation dilemmas and expediting solutions for color coordination and vaccination issues. Furthermore, the survey outlines three promising directions for future research: conducting human behavior experiments for empirical validation, leveraging advanced large language models as proxies for committed individuals in complex scenarios, and addressing the potential negative impacts of committed individuals.
引用
收藏
页数:8
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