Inferring Reputation Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation in Spatial Social Dilemma Games

被引:181
|
作者
Wang, Zhen [1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ]
Wang, Lin [7 ]
Yin, Zu-Yu [3 ]
Xia, Cheng-Yi [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Tianjin Univ Technol, Minist Educ, Key Lab Comp Vis & Syst, Tianjin, Peoples R China
[2] Tianjin Univ Technol, Tianjin Key Lab Intelligence Comp & Novel Softwar, Tianjin, Peoples R China
[3] Nankai Univ, Sch Phys, Tianjin 300071, Peoples R China
[4] Hong Kong Baptist Univ, Dept Phys, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[5] Hong Kong Baptist Univ, Ctr Nonlinear Studies, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[6] Hong Kong Baptist Univ, Beijing Hong Kong Singapore Joint Ctr Nonlinear &, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[7] Fudan Univ, Dept Elect Engn, Adapt Networks & Control Lab, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
来源
PLOS ONE | 2012年 / 7卷 / 07期
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
TIT-FOR-TAT; PRISONERS-DILEMMA; INDIRECT RECIPROCITY; WIN-STAY; STRATEGY; LOSE; EMERGENCE; RESONANCE; DYNAMICS; MOBILITY;
D O I
10.1371/journal.pone.0040218
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
In realistic world individuals with high reputation are more likely to influence the collective behaviors. Due to the cost and error of information dissemination, however, it is unreasonable to assign each individual with a complete cognitive power, which means that not everyone can accurately realize others' reputation situation. Here we introduce the mechanism of inferring reputation into the selection of potential strategy sources to explore the evolution of cooperation. Before the game each player is assigned with a randomly distributed parameter p denoting his ability to infer the reputation of others. The parameter p of each individual is kept constant during the game. The value of p indicates that the neighbor possessing highest reputation is chosen with the probability p and randomly choosing an opponent is left with the probability 1-p. We find that this novel mechanism can be seen as an universally applicable promoter of cooperation, which works on various interaction networks and in different types of evolutionary game. Of particular interest is the fact that, in the early stages of evolutionary process, cooperators with high reputation who are easily regarded as the potential strategy donors can quickly lead to the formation of extremely robust clusters of cooperators that are impervious to defector attacks. These clusters eventually help cooperators reach their undisputed dominance, which transcends what can be warranted by the spatial reciprocity alone. Moreover, we provide complete phase diagrams to depict the impact of uncertainty in strategy adoptions and conclude that the effective interaction topology structure may be altered under such a mechanism. When the estimation of reputation is extended, we also show that the moderate value of evaluation factor enables cooperation to thrive best. We thus present a viable method of understanding the ubiquitous cooperative behaviors in nature and hope that it will inspire further studies to resolve social dilemmas.
引用
收藏
页数:9
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