Earnings management, horizon problem, and advisor posts for retiring CEOs

被引：2

作者：

Ishida, Souhei ^{[1
]}

Ogoe, Satoshi ^{[2
]}

Suzuki, Katsushi ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Rikkyo Univ, Coll Econ, 3-34-1 Nishiikebukuro,Toshima Ku, Tokyo 1718501, Japan

[2] Hitotsubashi Univ, Grad Sch Int Corp Strategy, 2-1-2 Hitotsubashi,Chiyoda Ku, Tokyo 1018439, Japan

[3] Hitotsubashi Univ, Grad Sch Business Adm, 2-1-2 Hitotsubashi,Chiyoda Ku, Tokyo 1018439, Japan

来源：

PACIFIC-BASIN FINANCE JOURNAL | 2023年 / 78卷

基金：

日本学术振兴会;

关键词：

Earnings management; Horizon problem; Advisor; CEO post-retirement career; Co-opted board; Board independence; TOP EXECUTIVE TURNOVER; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; NONAUDIT SERVICES; FIRM PERFORMANCE; CAREER CONCERNS; ACCRUALS; QUALITY; REWARDS; JAPAN; BOARD;

D O I：

10.1016/j.pacfin.2023.101972

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

An advisor post is one of the most important post-retirement careers for a chief executive officer (CEO). Using unique hand-collected data on advisor posts in Japanese listed firms, we examine whether retiring CEOs overstate earnings to acquire an advisor post. Consistent with the horizon problem, we find that earnings overstatement is greater in the year immediately before the CEO's post-retirement career is determined to be an advisor. This relation is also more (less) pronounced for firms with weaker (stronger) internal monitoring. These results suggest that retiring CEOs choose income-increasing accounting to acquire an advisor position, and such opportunistic ac-counting choice is more (less) pronounced in firms with weaker (stronger) internal monitoring.

引用

页数：18