Relational incentive contracts and double moral hazard in service outsourcing

被引：0
|
作者：
Song, Han [1 ]
Dan, Bin [1 ]
Zhang, Xu-Mei [1 ]
机构：
[1] School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China
来源：
Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice | 2010年 / 30卷 / 11期
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D O I：
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摘要：
25
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页码：1944 / 1953
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