Research on preventing moral hazard of construction project based on information asymmetries

被引：0

作者：

Faculty of Construction Management and Real Estate, Chongqing University, China ^{[1
]}

不详 ^{[2
]}

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来源：

Open Construct. Build. Technol. J. | / 468-475期

关键词：

20;

D O I：

10.2174/1874836801408010468

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摘要：

引用

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[41] COLLATERAL AND COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA WITH MORAL HAZARD AND PRIVATE INFORMATION
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JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1987, 42 (02): : 345 - 363
[42] Contracting Information Security in the Presence of Double Moral Hazard
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[43] MORAL HAZARD AND INFORMATION SHARING - A MODEL OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION GATHERING AGENCIES
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[44] OPTIMAL RETAIL CONTRACTS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND MORAL HAZARD
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LEWIS, TR
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1994, 25 (02): : 284 - 296
[45] Information disclosure in mitigating moral hazard: An experimental investigation
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GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2024, 144 : 284 - 299
[46] A REVELATION MECHANISM FOR SOFT INFORMATION UNDER MORAL HAZARD
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[47] Information Asymmetry Leading to Adverse Selection or Moral Hazard
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RARITAN-A QUARTERLY REVIEW, 2016, 36 (01): : 138 - 139
[48] Optimal Contract under Moral Hazard with Soft Information
Roger, Guillaume
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS, 2013, 5 (04) : 55 - 80
[49] Asymmetric Information, Moral Hazard and the Insurance of Legal Expenses
Roger Bowles
Neil Rickman
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, 1998, 23 (2) : 196 - 209
[50] Capital budgeting and compensation with asymmetric information and moral hazard
Bernardo, AE
Cai, HB
Luo, J
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2001, 61 (03) : 311 - 344

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