The application of restorative justice in China's environmental crime: an evolutionary game perspective

被引:1
|
作者
Zhang, Xinrui [1 ]
Zhang, Jiashu [2 ]
机构
[1] Southeast Univ, Sch Law, Nanjing 210096, Peoples R China
[2] Southeast Univ, Sch Civil Engn, Nanjing 210096, Peoples R China
关键词
Restorative justice; Retributive justice; Evolutionary game; Environmental crime; Collaborative governance; DISCOURSE; DYNAMICS;
D O I
10.1007/s10611-024-10165-7
中图分类号
DF [法律]; D9 [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
The promotion of the restorative justice (RJ) concept has brought significant changes to China's environmental criminal justice system. However, the lack of empirical study makes it hard to support the existing normative arguments and jurisprudential analysis of environmental RJ practices in China. This study aims to investigate the evolutionary mechanisms of the RJ application in environmental crimes. To achieve this goal, a tripartite evolutionary game model comprising the judiciary, the offenders, and the victims, is established based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). Simulations based on 2022 China's environmental criminal justice data indicate that top-down environmental RJ reforms will face resistance due to insufficient public participation. To reverse this situation, we merge sensitivity analyses of model parameters with critical examinations of classical RJ theories. By analyzing the current status and future scenarios of RJ in China's environmental criminal justice, we suggest that: (1) Maintaining moderate penal intensity is the evolution-stable condition for the offenders to develop an intrinsic legal motivation to repair the environment. (2) To ensure both efficiency and fairness, the use of RJ should be determined based on the statutory length of sentences for environmental offenses. (3) Support for victims should be strengthened to increase their benefits from environmental RJ and reduce their legal costs. This paper is innovative in quantitatively evaluating the evolutionary mechanisms of the RJ application by using EGT, which adds to the body of knowledge on RJ conducted by qualitative research. The findings based on EGT can provide an answer to the persistent debate about the relationship between RJ and traditional justice (TJ). While the argument for replacing TJ with RJ may seem attractive, it is not feasible. Considering cost-benefit limitations, incorporating RJ into TJ could achieve positive outcomes in environmental crime.
引用
收藏
页码:717 / 750
页数:34
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [31] Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government Regulation and Enterprise Emission from the Perspective of Environmental Tax
    Mai, Yazong
    1ST INTERNATIONAL GLOBAL ON RENEWABLE ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT (IGRED 2017), 2017, 100
  • [32] Environmental crime. The criminal justice system's role in protecting the environment
    Tombs, S
    THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY, 2002, 6 (01) : 109 - 111
  • [33] Evolutionary dynamics in voluntary prisoner's dilemma game with environmental feedbacks
    Gao, Yan
    Li, Minlan
    Hu, Yuanyuan
    Wang, Rui-Wu
    Wang, Chao
    CHAOS SOLITONS & FRACTALS, 2024, 181
  • [34] Analysis of multi-agent greenwashing governance in China: A stochastic evolutionary game perspective
    Qu, Weihua
    Wu, Haojie
    Qu, Guohua
    Yin, Jie
    Cao, Jianhua
    JOURNAL OF CLEANER PRODUCTION, 2025, 492
  • [35] Regulation strategies of ride-hailing market in China: an evolutionary game theoretic perspective
    Lei, Li-cai
    Gao, Shang
    Zeng, En-yu
    ELECTRONIC COMMERCE RESEARCH, 2020, 20 (03) : 535 - 563
  • [36] Regulation strategies of ride-hailing market in China: an evolutionary game theoretic perspective
    Li-cai Lei
    Shang Gao
    En-yu Zeng
    Electronic Commerce Research, 2020, 20 : 535 - 563
  • [37] Evolutionary Game Study on the Development of Green Agriculture in China Based on Ambidexterity Theory Perspective
    Cui, Herui
    Zhao, Tian
    Tao, Peijun
    POLISH JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES, 2019, 28 (03): : 1093 - 1104
  • [38] An evolutionary game simulation of photovoltaic enterprise’s technological innovation in China
    Zhang, Li
    Xu, Yang
    Sang, Chunhong
    Light and Engineering, 2017, 25 (03): : 161 - 168
  • [39] Coordination of interests between local environmental protection departments and enterprises under China's environmental regulation policies: an evolutionary game theoretical approach
    Zhu, Xiaoya
    Meng, Xiaohua
    Teng, Chenmei
    FRONTIERS IN ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE, 2024, 12
  • [40] AN EVOLUTIONARY GAME SIMULATION OF PHOTOVOLTAIC ENTERPRISE'S TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION IN CHINA
    Zhang, Li
    Xu, Yang
    Sang, Chunhong
    LIGHT & ENGINEERING, 2017, 25 (03): : 161 - 168