The application of restorative justice in China's environmental crime: an evolutionary game perspective

被引:1
|
作者
Zhang, Xinrui [1 ]
Zhang, Jiashu [2 ]
机构
[1] Southeast Univ, Sch Law, Nanjing 210096, Peoples R China
[2] Southeast Univ, Sch Civil Engn, Nanjing 210096, Peoples R China
关键词
Restorative justice; Retributive justice; Evolutionary game; Environmental crime; Collaborative governance; DISCOURSE; DYNAMICS;
D O I
10.1007/s10611-024-10165-7
中图分类号
DF [法律]; D9 [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
The promotion of the restorative justice (RJ) concept has brought significant changes to China's environmental criminal justice system. However, the lack of empirical study makes it hard to support the existing normative arguments and jurisprudential analysis of environmental RJ practices in China. This study aims to investigate the evolutionary mechanisms of the RJ application in environmental crimes. To achieve this goal, a tripartite evolutionary game model comprising the judiciary, the offenders, and the victims, is established based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). Simulations based on 2022 China's environmental criminal justice data indicate that top-down environmental RJ reforms will face resistance due to insufficient public participation. To reverse this situation, we merge sensitivity analyses of model parameters with critical examinations of classical RJ theories. By analyzing the current status and future scenarios of RJ in China's environmental criminal justice, we suggest that: (1) Maintaining moderate penal intensity is the evolution-stable condition for the offenders to develop an intrinsic legal motivation to repair the environment. (2) To ensure both efficiency and fairness, the use of RJ should be determined based on the statutory length of sentences for environmental offenses. (3) Support for victims should be strengthened to increase their benefits from environmental RJ and reduce their legal costs. This paper is innovative in quantitatively evaluating the evolutionary mechanisms of the RJ application by using EGT, which adds to the body of knowledge on RJ conducted by qualitative research. The findings based on EGT can provide an answer to the persistent debate about the relationship between RJ and traditional justice (TJ). While the argument for replacing TJ with RJ may seem attractive, it is not feasible. Considering cost-benefit limitations, incorporating RJ into TJ could achieve positive outcomes in environmental crime.
引用
收藏
页码:717 / 750
页数:34
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [21] The Validator's Dilemma in PoW Blockchain: An Evolutionary Game Perspective
    Liu, Liang
    Wang, Qiao
    Turnbull, Stephen John
    Omote, Kazumasa
    2023 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BLOCKCHAIN, BLOCKCHAIN, 2023, : 17 - 24
  • [22] Evolutionary Game Analysis of Enterprise Lobbying Government from the Perspective of Environmental Tax
    Mai, Yazong
    PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2017 3RD INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON ENERGY, ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND MATERIALS (IFEESM 2017), 2017, 120 : 933 - 939
  • [23] Environmental justice and corporate green transition: a new perspective from environmental courts in China
    Li, Mengyu
    Zheng, Qian
    Zhang, Zicheng
    Zhao, Yu
    Chen, Shi
    ECONOMIC CHANGE AND RESTRUCTURING, 2025, 58 (01)
  • [24] The land hoarding and land inspector dilemma in China: An evolutionary game theoretic perspective
    Zhang, Xiaoling
    Bao, Haijun
    Skitmore, Martin
    HABITAT INTERNATIONAL, 2015, 46 : 187 - 195
  • [25] TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANIES AND DRIVERS DILEMMA IN CHINA: AN EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORETIC PERSPECTIVE
    Lei, Licai
    Gao, Shang
    TRANSPORT, 2019, 34 (05) : 579 - 590
  • [26] Environmental justice perspective on the distribution and determinants of polluting enterprises in Guangdong, China
    Liu, Wei
    Shen, Jing
    Wei, Yehua Dennis
    Chen, Wen
    JOURNAL OF CLEANER PRODUCTION, 2021, 317
  • [27] An evolutionary game study of environmental regulation strategies for marine ecological governance in China
    Gao, Lehua
    Yan, An
    Yin, Qiaorong
    FRONTIERS IN MARINE SCIENCE, 2022, 9
  • [28] Research on Environmental Pollution Control Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game in China's New-Type Urbanization
    Ding, Qianxing
    Zhang, Lianying
    Huang, Shanshan
    SUSTAINABILITY, 2024, 16 (15)
  • [29] Does environmental pollution promote China's crime rate? A new perspective through government official corruption
    Wu, Haitao
    Xia, Yufeng
    Yang, Xiaodong
    Hao, Yu
    Ren, Siyu
    STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS, 2021, 57 : 292 - 307
  • [30] An evolutionary game study on the collaborative governance of environmental pollution: from the perspective of regulatory capture
    Hu, Zikun
    Wang, Yina
    Zhang, Hao
    Liao, Wenjun
    Tao, Tingyu
    FRONTIERS IN PUBLIC HEALTH, 2024, 11