EQUILIBRIUM OF REPEATED GAMES WITH COST OF IMPLEMENTATION

被引：3
|
作者：
NEME, A
QUINTAS, L
机构：
[1] UNIV AUTONOMA BARCELONA,E-08193 BARCELONA,SPAIN
[2] NORTHWESTERN UNIV,KELLOGG GRAD SCH MANAGEMENT,DEPT MANAGERIAL ECON & DECIS SCI,EVANSTON,IL 60208
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1992年 / 58卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/0022-0531(92)90104-P
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We investigate the nature of the payoff discontinuity observed by Abreu and Rubinstein [Econometrica 56 (1988), 1259-1281]. We show that if we relax the assumption about the use of finite automata and refine the complexity measure then a "full" folk theorem holds. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C73. © 1992.
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页码：105 / 109
页数：5
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