Infinitely split Nash equilibrium problems in repeated games

被引:0
|
作者
Li J. [1 ]
机构
[1] Department of Mathematics, Shawnee State University, Portsmouth
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Fixed point theorem on posets; Infinitely split Nash equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; Repeated game;
D O I
10.1186/s13663-018-0636-1
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
In this paper, we introduce the concept of infinitely split Nash equilibrium in repeated games in which the profile sets are chain-complete posets. Then by using a fixed point theorem on posets in (J. Math. Anal. Appl. 409:1084–1092, 2014), we prove an existence theorem. As an application, we study the repeated extended Bertrant duopoly model of price competition. © The Author(s) 2018.
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