MORAL HAZARD IN THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP

被引：2
|
作者：
LAFFONT, JJ [1 ]
机构：
[1] UNIV TOULOUSE 1,GREMAQ,F-31042 TOULOUSE,FRANCE
来源：
REVUE ECONOMIQUE | 1987年 / 38卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/3501509
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：5 / 23
页数：19
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