Aggressive Bidding of Weak Bidders in All-Pay Auction

被引：0
|
作者：
Minchuk, Yizhaq [1 ]
机构：
[1] Shamoon Coll Engn, Dept Ind Engn & Management, Beer Sheva, Israel
来源：
ECONOMICS BULLETIN | 2014年 / 34卷 / 03期
关键词：
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We study an asymmetric all-pay auction with a general utility function. We show that high-type bidders in all-pay auction with lower density, are bidding more aggressively than bidders with higher density This result is contradictory to the result in Parreiras and Rubinchik (2010) on aggressive bidding of strong bidders.
引用
收藏
页码：1665 / 1668
页数：4
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