Aggressive Bidding of Weak Bidders in All-Pay Auction

被引：0
|
作者：
Minchuk, Yizhaq [1 ]
机构：
[1] Shamoon Coll Engn, Dept Ind Engn & Management, Beer Sheva, Israel
来源：
ECONOMICS BULLETIN | 2014年 / 34卷 / 03期
关键词：
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We study an asymmetric all-pay auction with a general utility function. We show that high-type bidders in all-pay auction with lower density, are bidding more aggressively than bidders with higher density This result is contradictory to the result in Parreiras and Rubinchik (2010) on aggressive bidding of strong bidders.
引用
收藏
页码：1665 / 1668
页数：4
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [21] Lottery Versus All-Pay Auction Models of Lobbying
    Hanming Fang
    Public Choice, 2002, 112 : 351 - 371
  • [22] The All-Pay Auction When a Committee Awards the Prize
    J. Atsu Amegashie
    Public Choice, 2003, 116 : 79 - 90
  • [23] The all-pay auction when a committee awards the prize
    Amegashie, JA
    PUBLIC CHOICE, 2003, 116 (1-2) : 79 - 90
  • [24] On the profitability of reducing competition in all-pay auctions with risk averse bidders
    Cingottini, Ilaria
    Menicucci, Domenico
    ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2006, 91 (02) : 260 - 266
  • [25] Handicaps in incomplete information all-pay auctions with a diverse set of bidders
    Kirkegaard, Rene
    EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2013, 64 : 98 - 110
  • [26] Discrete Two Player All-Pay Auction with Complete Information
    Dziubinski, Marcin
    Jahn, Krzysztof
    PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SECOND INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, IJCAI 2023, 2023, : 2659 - 2666
  • [27] An equilibrium characterization of an all-pay auction with certain and uncertain prizes
    Riis, Christian
    GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2016, 100 : 431 - 436
  • [28] Nonparametric identification and estimation of all-pay auction and contest models
    Shakhgildyan, Ksenia
    REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN, 2022,
  • [29] Collaborative Coded Computation Offloading: An All-pay Auction Approach
    Ng, Jer Shyuan
    Lim, Wei Yang Bryan
    Garg, Sahil
    Xiong, Zehui
    Niyato, Dusit
    Guizani, Mohsen
    Leung, Cyril
    IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATIONS (ICC 2021), 2021,
  • [30] Incentive Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An All-Pay Auction Approach
    Luo, Tie
    Das, Sajal K.
    Tan, Hwee Pink
    Xia, Lirong
    ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS AND TECHNOLOGY, 2016, 7 (03)
12345