AUCTIONING INCENTIVE CONTRACTS

被引：203
|
作者：
LAFFONT, JJ [1 ]
TIROLE, J [1 ]
机构：
[1] MIT,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02139
来源：
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY | 1987年 / 95卷 / 05期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1086/261496
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：921 / 937
页数：17
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