Modeling bidding competitiveness and position performance in multi-attribute construction auctions

被引:24
|
作者
Ballesteros-Perez, Pablo [1 ]
Luisa del Campo-Hitschfeld, Maria [2 ]
Mora-Melia, Daniel [1 ]
Dominguez, David [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Talca, Fac Ingn, Dept Ingn & Gest Construcc, Camino Los Niches, Curico, Chile
[2] Univ Talca, Fac Ingn, Ctr Sistemas Ingn KIPUS, Camino Los Niches, Curico, Chile
来源
关键词
Bidding; Tender; Auction; Competitiveness; Performance; Kumaraswamy;
D O I
10.1016/j.orp.2015.02.001
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Currently, multi-attribute auctions are becoming widespread awarding mechanisms for contracts in construction, and in these auctions, criteria other than price are taken into account for ranking bidder proposals. Therefore, being the lowest-price bidder is no longer a guarantee of being awarded, thus increasing the importance of measuring any bidder's performance when not only the first position (lowest price) matters. Modeling position performance allows a tender manager to calculate the probability curves related to the more likely positions to be occupied by any bidder who enters a competitive auction irrespective of the actual number of future participating bidders. This paper details a practical methodology based on simple statistical calculations for modeling the performance of a single bidder or a group of bidders, constituting a useful resource for analyzing one's own success while benchmarking potential bidding competitors. (c) 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
引用
收藏
页码:24 / 35
页数:12
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