SIGNALING BY MIDDLEMEN

被引：0
|
作者：
ARNOLD, MA
机构：
[1] Department of Economics, University of Delaware, Newark
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1993年 / 42卷 / 2-3期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/0165-1765(93)90060-P
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Two variations on signalling models which arise in markets with middlemen are presented. First, if middlemen are risk-neutral, then pooling always occurs in (Nash) equilibrium. Second, if middlemen are risk-averse, then pooling reactive equilibria may exist. The analysis offers insights into the absence of contracts designed to separate agents in many middleman relationships.
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页码：189 / 194
页数：6
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