WHY IS RENT-SEEKING SO COSTLY TO GROWTH

被引：185

作者：

MURPHY, KM ^{[1
]}

SHLEIFER, A ^{[1
]}

VISHNY, RW ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] HARVARD UNIV,DEPT ECON,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1993年 / 83卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：409 / 414

页数：6

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