The pitfalls and perils of payment by results

被引:3
|
作者
Boyle, David [1 ]
机构
[1] New Econ Fdn, 3 Jonathan St, London SE11 5NH, England
来源
LOCAL ECONOMY | 2011年 / 26卷 / 08期
关键词
accountability; gaming; Goodhart's Law; payment-by-results; targets;
D O I
10.1177/0269094211422203
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The targets culture in UK public services that emerged during the past two decades fell foul of Goodhart's Law, which led to increases in complexity and bureaucracy to counteract the gaming of the system by frontline staff. The emergence of payment-by-results claims to avoid this pitfall, but in practice it is likely to be exactly the same. In fact, there are aspects of payment-by-results which are likely to skew public sector objectives even more thoroughly than targets.
引用
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页码:627 / 634
页数:8
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