Reviving pragmatic theory of theory of mind

被引:14
|
作者
Frank, Chiyoko Kobayashi [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Fielding Grad Univ, Sch Psychol, Santa Barbara, CA 93105 USA
[2] Ctr Cognit & Commun, New York, NY 10016 USA
关键词
theory of mind; pragmatics; language; right-hemisphere damage; brain imaging; false-belief; domain-specificity;
D O I
10.3934/Neuroscience.2018.2.116
中图分类号
Q189 [神经科学];
学科分类号
071006 ;
摘要
Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to the ability to attribute mental states to self and others. It has been debated whether or not language capacity precedes ToM in development. Evidence from both neurological and developmental studies suggested that while linguistic capacity is important for ToM understanding, pragmatic component, which is a non-structural part of language, is more important for ToM. Moreover, given that pragmatic component of language is subserved by the right hemisphere of the brain, the evidence also indicates a significant overlap between the neural basis of ToM and that of pragmatic comprehension. The pragmatic theory of ToM, which I aim to revive in this review, firmly links pragmatics to ToM. It regards pragmatic aspects of language and ToM as extensively overlapping functions. I argue that research results from both developmental and neurological studies of ToM are beginning to converge to support this theory. Furthermore, I maintain that the pragmatic theory of ToM provides the best explanation for the seemingly incongruent results from recent child and infant studies on the developmental trajectory of ToM. Lastly, I will discuss whether this theory is in agreement with the domain-specific, the nativist framework, or neither.
引用
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页码:116 / 131
页数:16
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