Price vs quantity in a duopoly supergame with Nash punishments

被引：1
|
作者：
Baldelli, Serena [1 ]
Lambertini, Luca [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Bologna, Dept Econ, Str Maggiore 45, I-40125 Bologna, Italy
[2] Univ Amsterdam, Fac Econ & Econometr, ENCORE, NL-1018 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands
来源：
RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS | 2006年 / 60卷 / 03期
关键词：
Repeated games; Collusion; Product differentiation;
D O I：
10.1016/j.rie.2006.06.002
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We examine the endogenous choice between price and quantity behaviour in a duopoly supergame with product differentiation. We find that (i) if cartel profits are evenly split between firms, then only symmetric equilibria s obtained; (i) if instead the additional profits available through collusion are split according to the Nash bargaining solution, there are parameter regions where all subgame perfect equilibria are asymmetric, with firms colluding in price- quantity supergames. (C) 2006 University of Venice. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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页码：121 / 130
页数：10
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