PROPITIOUS SELECTION IN INSURANCE

被引:40
|
作者
HEMENWAY, D
机构
[1] Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, 02215, MA
关键词
INSURANCE; AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE; RISK; MORAL HAZARD; ADVERSE SELECTION;
D O I
10.1007/BF00057881
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The theory of propitious selection suggests that there are risk-avoiding personalities who both take physical precautions and buy financial security (insurance). Conversely, there are risk seekers who tend to do neither. Survey evidence is presented that is consistent with the theory. Individuals who obtain motor vehicle liability coverage are less likely than others to drink-and-drive, and are more likely to engage in health-beneficial (risk-avoiding) behaviors. Propitious selection may be a general phenomenon promoting favorable selection in many real world insurance markets.
引用
收藏
页码:247 / 251
页数:5
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