RENT A PERSON

被引：0

|

作者：

MITCHELL, A

机构：

来源：

NEW SOCIETY | 1972年 / 22卷 / 525期

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D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

D0 [政治学、政治理论];

学科分类号：

0302 ; 030201 ;

摘要：

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页码：201 / 202

页数：2

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