Dynamic coordination failures and the efficiency of the firm

被引：2
|
作者：
Goyal, S
Janssen, MCW
机构：
[1] ERASMUS UNIV ROTTERDAM,DEPT MICROECON,3000 DR ROTTERDAM,NETHERLANDS
[2] ERASMUS UNIV ROTTERDAM,INST ECONOMETR,3000 DR ROTTERDAM,NETHERLANDS
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 1995年 / 28卷 / 02期
关键词：
coordination games; signalling; organizational slack; incentive schemes;
D O I：
10.1016/0167-2681(95)00033-X
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper examines the role of coordination devices such as work norms in creating and sustaining inefficient organizational practices in firms, in a dynamic environment. The role of signalling norms and product market competition in alleviating such inefficiencies is also examined. In particular, we show that Cournot competition may increase the inefficiency of organizational practices.
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页码：223 / 239
页数：17
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