WHICH BANKS CHOOSE DEPOSIT INSURANCE - EVIDENCE OF ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD IN A VOLUNTARY INSURANCE SYSTEM

被引：28

作者：

WHEELOCK, DC ^{[1
]}

KUMBHAKAR, SC ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV TEXAS,AUSTIN,TX 78712

来源：

JOURNAL OF MONEY CREDIT AND BANKING | 1995年 / 27卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2077858

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：186 / 201

页数：16

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