Remuneration of Non-Executive Directors in German Listed Firms: An Empirical Analysis from a Practitioners' Perspective

被引：2

作者：

Lazar, Christian ^{[1
]}

Metzner, Yves ^{[1
]}

Rapp, Marc Steffen ^{[1
]}

Wolff, Michael ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Philipps Univ Marburg, Fac Business Adm & Econ, Marburg, Germany

[2] Univ Gottingen, Fac Econ Sci, Gottingen, Germany

来源：

ACCOUNTING ECONOMICS AND LAW-A CONVIVIUM | 2014年 / 4卷 / 01期

关键词：

varieties of corporate governance; Germany; director compensation; stock options;

D O I：

10.1515/ael-2013-0014

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We analyze director compensation in German listed firms for the 2005-2009 period. Our sample covers all listed companies in the German Prime Standard of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, specifically firms with shares listed in the indices of DAX, MDAX, SDAX, and TecDAX. In the last years, non-executive directors are facing increasing duties and (legal) responsibilities. From that perspective, it is quite surprising that the remuneration of non-executive directors has received rather little attention so far. In this study, we examine the German experience. We present the status quo of non-executive director remuneration and discuss its challenges. Specifically, we will look at the level of director remuneration and the (possible) problem of limited incentives.

引用

页码：1 / 16

页数：16

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