ACYCLIC CHOICE AND GROUP VETO

被引：11

|

作者：

KELSEY, D

机构：

来源：

SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | 1985年 / 2卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF00437313

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：131 / 137

页数：7

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