On game-theoretic characterisation of stochastic independence
被引:1
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作者:
Kreps, V. L.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
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Kreps, V. L.
机构:
来源:
DISCRETE MATHEMATICS AND APPLICATIONS
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2010年
/
20卷
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03期
关键词:
D O I:
10.1515/DMA.2010.016
中图分类号:
O29 [应用数学];
学科分类号:
070104 ;
摘要:
Dropping the assumption of the stochastic independence of players' randomised choices in non-cooperative games, we introduce the notion of a type of dependence. It is proved that the stochastic independence is the unique type of dependence for which any finite noncooperative game has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.
机构:
IMT Alti Studi Lucca, AXES Res Unit, Piazza S Francesco 19, I-55110 Lucca, ItalyIMT Alti Studi Lucca, AXES Res Unit, Piazza S Francesco 19, I-55110 Lucca, Italy
Gnecco, Giorgio
论文数: 引用数:
h-index:
机构:
Hadas, Yuval
Sanguineti, Marcello
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Genoa, Dept Bioengn Robot Informat & Syst Engn, Via Opera Pia 13, I-16145 Genoa, ItalyIMT Alti Studi Lucca, AXES Res Unit, Piazza S Francesco 19, I-55110 Lucca, Italy