DEBT, COLLATERAL, AND RENEGOTIATION UNDER MORAL HAZARD

被引：0
|
作者：
WONG, KP
机构：
[1] The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1992年 / 40卷 / 04期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/0165-1765(92)90145-O
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper demonstrates that renegotiation will increase initial collateral requirements in debt contracts under moral hazard. Hence, it confirms Smith and Warner's conjecture that severity of contractual covenants and ease of renegotiating debt contracts are positively related, in case where the covenant provision is collateral.
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页码：465 / 471
页数：7
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