CONTRACT RENEGOTIATION IN MODELS OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

被引：44
|
作者：
DEWATRIPONT, M [1 ]
MASKIN, E [1 ]
机构：
[1] HARVARD UNIV,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138
来源：
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1990年 / 34卷 / 2-3期
基金：
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/0014-2921(90)90103-6
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
[No abstract available]
引用
收藏
页码：311 / 321
页数：11
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