Private health insurance and the problem of moral hazard

被引:0
|
作者
Laskowska, Iwona [1 ]
机构
[1] Uniwersytet Lodzki, Katedra Ekonometrii Przestrzennej, Ul Rewolucji 1905 R 37, PL-90214 Lodz, Poland
来源
关键词
private health insurance; moral hazard;
D O I
10.7172/1644-9584.53.3
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
In most European countries general health insurance systems are supplemented by voluntary health insurance purchased on a commercial basis. The expansion of the private health insurance market is potentially beneficial for the functioning of the health protection system and for the patients themselves. At the same time, however, particularly voluntary health insurance has certain weaknesses that may make it less effective than it could be. One of the major problems is moral hazard understood as a risk of excessive, unjustified use of medical services that bears serious economic consequences. The article focuses on moral hazard related to health insurance. In the first part of the article, the nature of the problem is discussed, as well as conclusions for European countries arising from the available studies. The second part provides insights into private health insurance in Poland.
引用
收藏
页码:58 / 68
页数:11
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