KIN-SELECTION, RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM, AND INFORMATION SHARING AMONG MAINE LOBSTERMEN

In this paper, the sharing of information about the location of lobsters among lobstermen in two Maine harbors is described. First, why the sharing of such information is likely to entail an economic loss for the transmitters is explained. Then, the extent to which the principles of kin-selection and reciprocal altruism can account for the sharing of information is determined. Many cases of information sharing in one of the harbors do not appear to be the type of kin-directed or reciprocal acts expected to be produced by kin-selection or reciprocal altruism as they are usually conceived. The behavior of these lobstermen may be the result of the advantages of maintaining a complex web of social relationships among them. Failure to appreciate the complexity of such relationships in some fishing communities is suggested to be a major shortcoming in the economic models previously used to explain information management among commercial fishermen. I conclude that a more complex model of reciprocal altruism is needed to account for the information sharing among this group of Maine lobstermen, and perhaps many other human social groups.