AGENCY DISCRETION UNDER JUDICIAL-REVIEW

被引:20
|
作者
SPILLER, PT [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV ILLINOIS,INST GOVT & PUBL AFFAIRS,URBANA,IL 61801
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0895-7177(92)90095-3
中图分类号
TP39 [计算机的应用];
学科分类号
081203 ; 0835 ;
摘要
This paper analyzes the extent of agency discretion under different assumptions concerning judicial review: a) discrete judicial decision making; b) multi-member courts; c) decision costs at the Courts; d) multi-layer judiciary. The main results of this paper are: a) discrete judicial decision making and decision making costs at the Court generate agency discretion; b) Agency discretion is reduced, however, by introducing further levels of judicial review; c) Multi-member Courts do not seem to generate important implications for agency discretion.
引用
收藏
页码:185 / 200
页数:16
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